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Introduction 
 
Between  1843 and 1861, the role of the Italian  moderates1 was decisive in the process of the 
country’s unification. The latest historiography has extensively analyzed such a role in all of its 
internal and international implications and has often emphasized a kind of cultural backwardness on 
the part of the Italian moderates with respect to the major European currents of thought2. In this 
regard, Luca Mannori has analyzed the inconsistency of the image of the Italian liberals portrayed 
as a feeble and narrow minded culture, vis a vis the mobilization for the constitution ‘involving all 
of the States of the peninsula in the first few months of 1848’. In other words, he enquires as to how 
such a situation could have occurred3.  
This essay aims to contribute to eliminating such prejudice against the Italian moderates of this 
historical period by analyzing a fundamental aspect of their politics connected to beliefs and 
theoretical intuitions that would prove to be decisive in the transition from the old monarchic and 
aristocratic world to the new democratic one. 
The motto used for the coronation of Victor Emanuel II as King of Italy, ‘by the grace of God and 
by the will of the nation’, was substantially a contradictory statement recalling two principles of 
legitimacy of power which could potentially be antithetic.  Yet, that compromise was the final result 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The definition of ‘moderatism’ and its association with the term liberalism has always raised a lively debate in the 
context of Italian historiography. Aurelian Craiutu, who explored the issue concerning French political thought, has 
described ‘moderation’ as a kind of ‘archipelago’ which still needs to be re-examined and whose main preoccupation 
has concerned ‘ending the revolution’. (A. Craiutu, A Virtue for Courageous Minds. Moderation in French Political 
Thought, 1748-1830, Princeton-Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2012, p. 1). Antonio Chiavistelli, in the entry 
‘moderate / democratic’ of his recent Atlante culturale del Risorgimento, states: ‘In those years, the liberal brand could 
apply, with no embarrassment, to both to those who had declared themselves democratic as well as to those who 
preferred to be defined moderate’. Chiavistelli also quotes Cesare Balbo to highlight the fact that among the liberals 
there were those who sought change through ‘legitimate methods’ and those who sought them through  ‘Jacobin  
methods’ (A. Chiavistelli, Moderati/Democratici, in A.M. Banti, A. Chiavistelli, L. Mannori, M. Meriggi [eds], Atlante 
culturale del Risorgimento. Lessico del linguaggio politico dal Settecento all’Unità, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2011, pp. 115-
133).  
2	  See for example Guido de Ruggero in Il pensiero politico meridionale nei secoli XVIII e XIX, Bari, Laterza, 1954, pp. 
217-218, R. Romeo, Il giudizio storico sul Risorgimento, Catania, Bonanno Editore, 1966, pp. 111-113, S. La Salvia, Il 
moderatismo in Italia, in U. Corsini, R. Lill [eds], Istituzioni e ideologie in Italia e in Germania tra le rivoluzioni, 
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1987, pp. 175-177, R. Romanelli, Nazione e costituzione nell’opinione liberale avanti il ’48, in P. 
L. Ballini (ed.), La rivoluzione liberale e le nazioni divise, Venezia, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2000, 
pp. 280-284. Maurizio Isabella e Roberto Romani have revised these points of view. In his study on Cesare Balbo, 
Isabella, in contrast with Romanelli, has tried ‘to locate the political thought carried out by Balbo and his colleagues at 
the heart of contemporary European debates, the French one in particular, regarding liberty and aristocracy’ (M. 
Isabella, Aristocratic Liberalism and Risorgimento: Cesare Balbo and Piedmontese Political Thought after 1848, 
‘History of European Ideas’, 2013, n. 6, p. 835). Romani, on the other hand, has shown that even though it is true that 
moderatism, especially the kind carried out in Piedmont, changed in 1848, it nevertheless ‘retained its conservative 
character. The task facing Piedmont in the 1850s was formidable. It consisted in consolidating constitutional 
government at home, and at the same time it subverted the European balance of power, and arguably the Pope’s 
temporal power, without unleashing democracy or, worse still, socialism’, (R. Romani, Reluctant Revolutionaries: 
Moderate Liberalism in the Kingdom of Sardinia, 1849-1859, ‘The Historical Journal’, 2012, n. 1, p. 49, see also Id., 
Political Thought in Action: the Moderates in 1859, ‘Journal of Modern Italian Studies’, 2012, n. 5, pp. 593-607, and  
Liberal Theocracy in the Italian Risorgimento, ‘European History Quarterly’, 2014, n. 4, pp. 620-650).	  
3	   L. Mannori, Il dibattito istituzionale in Italia al tornante degli anni Quaranta, in M. L. Betri (ed.), Rileggere 
l’Ottocento. Risorgimento e nazione, Torino, Carocci, 2010, p. 64.	  
of both the moderates’ influence on the Risorgimento and of Count Cavour’s wise conduct after 
18494.  
My aim in this essay is to show how the Italian moderates, from the most conservative to the most 
progressive,  succeeded, from 1843, in controlling the patriotic movement, rejecting the republican 
option as unfeasible in a country that was still profoundly monarchical. They were also able to limit 
the democratic thrust, which came from  the epic deeds of the revolutionary period,  channeling it 
within the idea of a representative government led by public opinion and by the higher ranking 
monarchical power. They could benefit both from the English and French experience, the latter after 
the Restoration, and understood, only after the institution of a constitutional monarchy and only 
under its protective shield, that some of the achievements of the French Revolution, from the point 
of view of freedom, civil rights and political participation, could have been preserved.  
In the first part, we will see how the moderates, between 1843 and 1846, sought first of all to create 
a common public opinion within the various states of the Italian peninsula urging their sovereigns to 
commit to the cause of national unity.  This federalist plan would not be carried out through a 
Jacobin popular revolution, but through a number of gradual reforms conceded from above, 
enlightened by advisory and deliberative bodies and by public opinion itself, guided by the most 
educated men. During this stage, opposing opinions emerged concerning the concept of 
representative government, owing to issues of political convenience (the presence of censorship, the 
counteroffensive carried out by reactionary forces, etc.) as well as to real theoretical divergences.      
The second part, instead, will deal with the crucial two-year period that followed which led to the 
first War of Independence of 1848-49, during which even the most conservative moderates openly 
sided with the representative government, following the constitutional turn occurred in Piedmont. In 
this setting, Vincenzo Gioberti converted to democracy with the intention of connecting the 
consensus of the masses to the actions of the monarchy in view of achieving the country’s unity.  
Finally, in the third section, I will show how, in spite of Gioberti’s broadened perspective, many 
moderate conservatives, particularly from Piedmont, such as Cesare Balbo and the Count of 
Cavour, continued to be suspicious of popular sovereignty and favored and encouraged the 
monarchical principle, supported by a limited suffrage to avoid revolutionary upheavals. 
Nevertheless, Cavour and others were also ready to invoke a plebiscite against those legitimate 
sovereigns who opposed the Sabaudian state’s annexation of their territories.   
 
 
§ 1 On the path of reform towards national unity.  
 
As highlighted by a well-established historiography, at the beginning of the 1840s, moderate writers 
began to create a kind of embryonic public opinion which would spread throughout the ‘small 
states’ of the peninsula5. These writers accepted the incitement received by Niccolò Tommaseo, one 
of the forerunners and promoters of the national debate on independence, freedom and the country’s 
unity. His goal was to ‘prepare a like-minded attitude’ towards these ideas to convince the 
peninsula’s sovereigns to change their opinion, also urging them to carry out ‘good deeds’.  As 
Tommaseo wrote, it certainly was not by means of violent revolutions aimed at subverting the 
authority that any tangible result would be reached. In fact, revolutions would prove to be ‘if not 
fatal, filled with dangers, to say the least’, while ‘the most desirable reforms were those conceded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 R. Romeo, Il Risorgimento: realtà storica e tradizione morale, in Id., Dal Piemonte sabaudo all’Italia liberale, 
Torino, Einaudi, 1964, pp. 262-269. See also D. Settembrini, Storia dell’idea antiborghese in Italia 1860-1989, Bari, 
Laterza, 1991, pp. 26-27. 
5 L. Cafagna, Cavour, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, p. 138. L. Mannori, La crisi dell’ordine plurale. Nazione e costituzione 
in Italia tra Sette e Ottocento, in M. Fioravanti (ed.), Ordo juris. Storia e forme dell’esperienza giuridica, Milano, 
Giuffrè, 2005, p. 177, S. De Luca, L’Italia immaginata dai moderati. “Nation building” e “State-building” in Gioberti, 
Balbo e d’Azeglio (1843-1847), “Storia del pensiero politico”, 2012, n. 3, pp. 495-525. 
from above, i.e.  by the authority, and  granted in the fashion and through the constraints of the 
times’6. 
In his Primato of 1843, the text which initiated the debate, Vincenzo Gioberti highlighted that in 
order to reach the goals that many patriots had wished for, an agreement between the princes and 
the  people would be vital, otherwise the very existence of civilization would be jeopardized. He 
also affirmed that ‘the representative monarchy was the master in  Europe’ even if in many areas it 
was only in its ‘initial stages’. Civilization in politics, as well as in religion, meant aiming for 
‘representative orders’ which had to result from ‘the accord between past and future memories and 
hopes, tradition and innovation, stability and progress of the hereditary monarchy and the elective 
Few’. The representative government was equally alien to ‘opposite excesses, such as pure 
democracy and despotic monarchy’. Moreover, Gioberti was well aware that democracy ‘in modern 
life’ had taken over all ‘regiments’, but thought that the only reasonable democracy was the kind 
conforming to aristocratic virtue, genius and soul, which stood between ‘feudal patriciate’ and 
‘plebeian democracy’. ‘Democratic orders’ in fact, were ‘not so justifiable in civil States that were 
not extremely small’. ‘The dogma of popular sovereignty’ was in contradiction with ‘the original 
tenor of science’ and with the progress of civilization. The people could acquire political rights 
‘only by escaping the plebeian condition, (…) through civilization’ and through the action of the 
monarch who bestowed ‘a ray of his majesty’7. 
 Cesare Balbo, like Gioberti, considered the agreement between the princes and the people 
indispensable, as he wrote in Speranze d’Italia: ‘What we can achieve is a similar or higher degree 
of law, which may be obtained from our princes and which cannot be had without them’. It was 
only by following the ‘rule of law, legality, legitimacy (all synonyms)’ in this ‘good undertaking’ 
that the support of ‘the public opinion, which is forceful’ can be enjoyed. It is well known how in 
his book Balbo had underscored the importance of independence, postponing the issue of freedom 
and had suggested that the princes adopt ‘advisory’ instead of ‘deliberative’ governments for fear 
that parliamentary divisions would hinder the achievement of independence, as in ‘the terrible 
examples offered by France and Spain’. In principle though, Balbo was not against the deliberative 
form of government if it were introduced by a prince; thus, he ‘would employ the highest means of 
popularity and unity in Italy’ and from that point on ‘the foreigner’s anguish on Italian land’ would 
begin. What Balbo would not accept, then or even later, was the change produced  by a constituent 
assembly or a convention, which he considered ‘a truly backward invention’8. 
 The contributions by Massimo d’Azeglio and Giacomo Durando are certainly among the 
most important offered in this debate. D’Azeglio was well aware of the ‘raging’ fight concerning 
the principle of popular sovereignty, which ‘provoked discord as soon as it was uttered’. In the past, 
divine right had been able to support power because everyone believed in it, but at this time all 
civilized nations were approaching the ‘common law’ and public opinion was becoming ‘the true 
ruler of the world’. If, during this transition process, the highly contentious term ‘popular 
sovereignty’ could be replaced by expressions like ‘universal consensus’ and still remain 
disallowed,  both  should at least have been acknowledged as standing for ‘the actual foundation of 
power’. Hence, the various Italian sovereigns would have had to unite in view of national interest 
and become ‘moderate liberals’ so that their subjects would not become ‘fanatic liberals’ embracing 
the principle of revolution. D’Azeglio, in fact, saw ‘the rapid approach of an era in which nations’ 
would be ‘the safest grounds for thrones’9. Durando, instead, thought that the idea of taking an 
active part in managing one’s own interests, which had originated during the French revolution, had 
by then become the general tendency of the people. The Congress of Vienna opposed this tendency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 N. Tommaseo, Un affetto. Memorie politiche (1839), Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1974, p. 32. 
7 V. Gioberti, Del primato morale e civile degli italiani (1843), Brusselle, Meline-Cans, 1845, pp. 89, clxxxiv, cdli, 174, 
315-317. 
8 C. Balbo, Delle speranze d’Italia (1843), Capolago, Tipografia elvetica, 1844, pp. 228-235, 244. 
9 M. d’Azeglio, Degli ultimi casi di Romagna, Lugano, Tipografia della Svizzera italiana, 1846, pp. 89-90, 99-100. Id., 
Proposta d’un programma per l’opinione nazionale italiana, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1847, pp. 14, 16, 26. 
with its ‘inextricable tangle of legitimacy’ which, of course, applied to Italy, ‘a nation that in a 
certain sense, had been saturated with French ideas for twenty years’. Durando wrote that amongst 
the ‘strugglers’, amid those who impatiently proposed violence and conspiracy (the subversive 
liberalism of the 18th century supporting demagogic democracy) and those who defended  the Status 
quo, there were also ‘the moderate friends of a balanced prosperity for all, those who want to 
preserve the monarchic principle because of the existence of the liberal principle’.  Not supporting 
the latter group meant that ‘if the day came when the waters were to break the dams, the monarchic 
principle would either be isolated or surrounded only by a faction of incorrigible spirits’. For this 
reason and in spite of Balbo, Durando suggested not to separate the issue of freedom from the issue 
of independence and urged the princes ‘to change the existing forms of government by grafting a 
deliberative regime upon them, called constitutional or representative’10.  
 Balbo’s position, on the contrary, was supported by Cavour in his first important public 
document, the famous essay written in 1846 concerning the Italian railway system. He stated that in 
the general context of the Congress of Vienna there had been a constant appeal only to the law of 
the strongest, thus constructing ‘a political edifice devoid of any moral foundation’, turning the 
possibility of a democratic revolution into an actual danger. At the same time though, Cavour was 
also convinced that a democratic revolution had no ‘chance of being successful’ because, except for 
a few cities, the democrats did not particularly enjoy the sympathy of the masses, who were 
‘generally very much attached to the country’s old institutions’. For this reason, Balbo’s appeal in 
Speranze d’Italia rightfully attracted those who ‘elected the principle of legitimacy as the 
foundation of their political beliefs because they were loyal to their ancestors’ traditions’11. In 
October of 1847, Cavour wrote to Léon Costa de Beauregard affirming: ‘I am convinced that order 
is necessary for the development of society; amongst all guarantees of order, the best is a legitimate 
power which is deeply rooted in the history of the country’12. 
 Michelangelo Castelli, a friend of Cavour and a future collaborator of the paper ‘Il 
Risorgimento’, knew that to conquer public opinion it was necessary to face the absolutists 
legitimists. On the other hand, this was the only opinion which had been allowed to circulate freely 
in Italy and which succeeded in describing as an ‘exaggeration’ ‘what the French called 
moderation’. Castelli was wondering who, in his day, could ‘still say that the principles, the 
doctrines and the theories supporting liberal opinion are anarchic, enemies of religion and thrones, 
and that even the simplest demonstration on their part must be repressed?’. The times were ripe for 
a constitution establishing ‘the kinds of relationships between the nation and the prince’, so that the 
citizens, with their right to ‘contribute to making the laws’ could work alongside the ‘inviolable’ 
king.  Castelli maintained that on the other hand, ‘national thrones were sacred to all Italians, and 
even though certain monarchic benefits were metaphysical, i.e. unperceived by many, the mere 
doubt as to the necessity of a hereditary monarchic order would mean not recognizing history and 
men’13. 
On the opposite side and in agreement with Giuseppe Mazzini and the democrats, Giuseppe 
Napoleone Ricciardi engaged in the challenge of the moderates, who were struggling to conquer 
public opinion: ‘If the axiom in politics is that revolutions are prepared by writers and that 
providing that certain beliefs are not rooted within the majority, no change can ever take place in 
the destiny of a people, I believe that the sacred obligation of every Italian writer is to purposely 
attempt to make the homeland able and ready for necessary and desired upheavals’. This criticism 
basically echoed what Santorre Santarosa had already expressed in 1821: ‘When has a prince ever 
voluntarily surrendered to the wishes of the people?’. Considering that ‘the obvious tendency of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 G. Durando, Della nazionalità italiana. Saggio politico-militare, Losanna, Bonamici e Compagni, 1846, pp. 22, 28, 
30, 49, 50, 189, 195. 
11 C. Cavour, De chemins de fer en Italie (1846), in Id., Tutti gli scritti, Torino, Centro studi piemontesi, 1976, vol. II, 
pp. 951-954. 
12 C. Cavour, Epistolario, cit., vol. IV, p. 349. 
13	  M. Castelli, Saggi sull’opinione politica moderata in Italia, Italia, 1847, pp. 36-37, 82, 142, 144, 161, 181. 
civil world was to be entirely democratic’, entailed  that ‘the national will’ represented the ‘only 
legitimate source of all public authority’,  making it therefore immediately necessary to ‘raise the 
flag of the people, the banner much dreaded  by the Republicans’14. 
 
 
§ 2 The representative government and the democratic turn.  
 
As known, shortly after this debate the situation rapidly changed with the election of Pope Pius IX 
and with the beginning of a season of reform which involved the main Italian states, the prelude to 
the first war of Independence, which took place in 1848 - 1849. Silvio Spaventa, from March to 
July 1848 in articles written for the Neapolitan newspaper  ‘Il Nazionale’, openly supported 
independence and the representative system, writing that ‘the tangible history of the Italian 
Risorgimento’ was starting with the new Pope and that ‘the ideal emblem which expressed its 
nature and its course was the system of agreement between the monarchy and the people’, which, 
nevertheless, would remain faulty if reform did not lead to a constitution. The monarchies’ main 
task would be to ‘serve the nation’ and ‘become the Peoples’ unifiers’15. The disastrous outcome of 
the war, both in its ‘federal’ and subsequent ‘democratic’ phase, favored only one constitutional 
regime, that of Sabaudian Piedmont, which alone held high the Italian flag.  Even though Charles 
Albert’s former concession of a representative government had been carried out reluctantly16, it  did 
obtain the approval of all the Italian liberals who had long demanded it. On 4 February 1848, in an 
article that appeared in the newspaper ‘Il Risorgimento’, Cavour stated that ‘the people were 
prepared to exercise their political rights’ and ‘those who could fittingly represent them by carrying 
out the serious responsibilities of deliberative orders were not lacking within the nations’. In an 
article which appeared on 10 March, Cavour defended the statute from the attacks of its adversaries, 
as it included ‘all of the great principles of a free constitution’ and it consecrated ‘all the rights 
enjoyed by the most civilized nations’. Furthermore, such a statute limited the executive power 
‘without overwhelmingly weakening the governing force’ and guaranteed personal freedom and 
civil equality, all principles which, in 1789, represented ‘the true basis of free life’. As in the 
English monarchy however, the ‘constitutional power’ lay jointly with the king and the House of 
Commons17.  The concession of the Charter also drew the more skeptical and fearful legitimist 
conservatives closer to the national cause. Count Carlo Ilarione Petitti di Roreto, in fact, declared: 
‘The following cannot be denied: that the firm and steady tendency to proclaim and maintain each 
nationality marks our century; that nationality can only be based on reasonable public and private 
freedom; that building it by means of conspiracy and rebellion, as occurred in other times, has 
proven ineffective; that only the loyal agreement between the prince and the people of the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 G. N. Ricciardi, Conforti all’Italia, ovvero preparamenti all’insurrezione, Parigi, Dai torchi di François, 1846, pp. iv, 
16, 128, 130, 152, 168. 
15	  S. Spaventa, Dal 1848 al 1861. Lettere, scritti documenti (1897), Bari, Laterza, 1923, pp. 19, 27, 31.	  
16 On 1 February 1848, Charles Albert had written to Count Giacinto Borrelli saying that he could not tolerate a popular 
demonstration like the one that was taking place in Genoa, as its goal was to demand a constitution; therefore he would 
oppose it strenuously. Two days later, during  the conseil de conference chaired by the king, the situation changed and 
Borrelli said that if His Majesty deemed the constitution as inevitable, he was to grant it with the highest dignity. Even a 
pure conservative like Count Revel went so far as to suggest this choice to the king, even though it was in contrast with 
‘the principles on which he had been educated (…) all his life’. In fact, he understood very well that ‘his country was 
not mature for a representative regime and that its adoption would produce ‘sectarian results’. The Marq. Cesare Alfieri, 
during the session held on 7 February, was outraged by the press, which had spread the momentous opinion ‘that 
democracy was a powerful component of our days’ and for this very reason the government had to defend this  opinion 
announcing the  foundations for a statute and for a representative government,  (Lo Statuto Albertino e la sua 
preparazione, edited by G. Falco, Roma, Capriotti, 1945, pp. 97, 180-181, 203-204). 
17 C. Cavour, Tutti gli scritti, cit., vol. III, pp. 1083, 1113-1116. For P.G. Massimo Turina, ‘The hereditary 
constitutional monarchy, with a deliberating popular representation, elected by all the citizens who have an interest in 
order and in the strict compliance to the law’, seemed to unite ‘all the advantages of the Republic without having any of 
its drawbacks’,  Della missione del giornalismo, Torino, Giuseppe Pomba e Compagnia, 1848, p. 19. 
nation, can make such an enterprise successful’. Even Petitti had been forced to admit ‘that the 
democratic tendency has become collective’. He also acknowledged  that ‘true equality of rights 
and duties and the abolition of all privileges pertaining to class, position or any other distinction 
among citizens is an inescapable necessity of the times. At the present state of civilization it is 
impossible to ignore such a necessity without  seriously compromising the law of the State which is 
not  incompatible with the representative monarchy’. It was not necessary to have a republican form 
of government to ‘found democracy’; in the end, the republicans certainly ‘made lots of noise’ but 
were few and, according to Gioberti, ‘truly backward’18.  
Petitti echoed Ercole Ricotti, who had written: ‘Yesterday Piedmont took its place next to the 
civilized nations, few of which have achieved such a status through similar high and virtuous 
venues. Piedmont did not succeed through rows and bloodshed nor by trampling on existent 
powers, which instead have led them hither, without a cry, without a tear, guided by its king, with 
the solemn attention of the people who are carrying out the greatest deed of  their existence’19. In 
this climate, the future prime minister of the Kingdom of Italy, Bettino Ricasoli while in Florence 
stated that ‘the concept of the Italian Risorgimento was inseparable from the idea of what is civil, 
and the Italian monarchy could not exist if not under the condition of being civil’20. Also in Parma, 
a conservative such as Count Linati drew closer to the representative monarchy, which for him was 
‘the most perfect form of civil regime’. The representative monarchy was the last resort to curb that 
‘false and evil spirit leading to the twilight of our civilization’, the American ‘degradation’ to which 
those European nations engaged in ‘rebuilding a new social edifice upon ancient ruins’ were 
attracted. In fact, social authority had to remain free from the will of its associates and could not be 
annulled, since in politics the ‘dangerous consequences’ of the direct examination of the Holy 
Scriptures had to be rejected. After all ‘for the princes to reiterate that their authority came from 
God was not totally unreasonable, since tracing multiplicity back to its sole representative and 
harmonizing the differences for the common good, made such authority the minister and imitator of 
divine providence’21. Also according to Antonio Rosmini, in order to dispel the fatal error dating 
back to the French Revolution, which had sprouted popular despotism and revolutions against every 
government, it was necessary for ‘the nation to be represented by the people’s deputies joined to the 
sovereign, who was to ensure the balance between the Chambers’22. 
After forming his ministry in December of 1848, Gioberti increasingly exposed the moderates’ 
Risorgimento to democratic ideas. The speech that he addressed to the parliamentary chamber on 
the first day of his ministry, 18 December 1848, with the intention to resume the battle against 
Austria after the Salasco armistice, exemplified the new role that the term democracy had 
undertaken within the Italian context. For Gioberti, being democratic meant raising the mob to 
dignity, respecting equality before the law, caring for the interests of the cities as well as taking care 
of the provinces and building a national guard to defend freedom. For him, ‘Democracy in these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 C.I. Petitti di Roreto, Sull’attuale condizione del Risorgimento italiano. Pensieri (1848), in Id., Opere scelte, cit., vol. 
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few months’. Even though  he publically admitted it, he considered ‘the Statute wrong in many ways’ and 
disconsolately concluded: ‘What does the Italian Risorgimento gain from this, and who knows how we will come out of 
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terms’ could not ‘make anyone jealous. It is the only form which answers to its name and which is 
worthy of the People, as it is virtuous, generous, and the ally of order, property, and the throne. It is 
strongly opposed to dissoluteness, violence and blood shedding; it is not repulsed by those classes 
which were once called privileged, (democracy) stretches out its friendly hand, inviting them to 
unite in the holy deed of facilitating and saving our homeland’23. 
But above all, it was  with his Del Rinnovamento Civile in Italia of 1851 that Gioberti consecrated 
his democratic turn. Freedom was to shape the monarchy and the people were to participate in the 
government; in fact, ‘the foundation of every legitimate political investiture was the free consensus 
of the masses’. All the institutions had to preserve a vital principle and once they became obsolete 
they could not be brought back to life through violence, like ‘the French legitimists were trying to 
do to revive old fashioned forms of monarchy’. The vital principle, according to Gioberti, had to 
come from the people and not from ‘sects’, ‘invasions’ or ‘conquests’.  Instead, ‘the arrangements 
and the botched up politics which took place in various parts of Europe’ from 1815 onwards, were 
of that nature24. 
Even closer to the republicans, but keeping their main focus on the monarchy, were writers like 
Francesco Domenico Guerrazzi or Cavour’s famous opponent, Angelo Brofferio. For them, the 
monarchy was certainly losing its glow of mystic legitimacy and the republic was recognized as 
‘the final form of government to which all people aspire’; in fact, divine right would finally be 
dispelled ‘as an error in the night’25. In 1848, Guerrazzi wrote: ‘Derive the kings’ origins from God; 
have the divine ampulla descend from heaven for their consecration; anoint them to make them 
religious; believe in their virtues, which heal scrofula or other similar illnesses by the mere touch of 
their toe; in excellence, salute them as if they were the image of God on earth. All of such 
impertinence is less the work of princes than of abject flatterers surrounding them and poisoning 
their spirit’26. In 1850, Brofferio, in the same tone, wrote: ‘Allied sovereigns invented divine right 
and theological legitimacy for themselves, which were to be ever more respected and far less 
understood’. For this reason, he had invited the monarchy to ‘become democratic and republican’27.    
 
 
3 § The moderate conservative’s response and the instrumental use of popular sovereignty. 
  
The stance of the pro-democratic liberals  could thus be viewed as a kind of capitulation to 
republican authors for whom, obviously, the monarchic era had come to an end with no space for 
fear or recrimination. Hence, Cavour undertook the task of retorting such affirmations when writing 
a review of Brofferio’s works. He observed how ‘in every passage’ one could find ‘a resonant word, 
a passionate exclamation in praise of democracy’, a ‘supple word that equally applied to very 
different systems, equivalent to rather different ideas when it was voiced by Gioberti or Mazzini, or 
by Louis Blanc or by an American who was a follower of Washington or  Jefferson’.  Which term 
was preferred by Brofferio, the ‘pure’ one or the one ‘tempered by the monarchy’? Too tepid 
towards reforms and much inclined towards revolutionary means, Brofferio should not forget that 
Piedmont was the one to give ‘a wonderful example of peaceful revolutions, of organized freedom, 
of harmony between the monarchy and civilization’28. 
Federigo Sclopis and Domenico Carutti replied to the writers who were more inclined towards 
democracy, with an obvious debt towards both Burke and the doctrinarians. Sclopis, whose stance 
harmonized with the most conservative writers, had previously pointed out how granting the 
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25 F. D. Guerrazzi, Condizioni italiane (1848), in Id., Scritti politici, Torino-Milano, Guigoni, 1862, pp. 118, 133. 
26 Ivi, pp. 130-131. 
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Statute, even in the wake of the French events had been a wise gesture, since ‘resisting would have 
caused greater agitation’, in the same way that for many, ‘a weak beverage from the cup of freedom 
was like a potion offered by a makeshift nurse’.  Nevertheless, he later specified that ‘the people’s 
constitutions were not established beforehand, but were the product of their physical and moral 
temperament and the result of their civilization’. Moreover, according to him, this longing for a 
constitution could be traced back to the times of Baldassarre Castiglione29. For Domenico Carutti 
on the other hand, popular consensus was necessary both in hereditary monarchies and in republics, 
albeit only with the representative system. Furthermore, ‘raising the poor plebe to the dignity of a 
people’ would be possible through education and ‘economic improvements’. This was in fact ‘the 
true meaning of the democratic government, which had been so badly corrupted by those who 
would have liked to level everything to an absurd equality, disregarding any moral height’ enjoying 
‘preeminence and a plebian kingdom’.  
In reality, speaking of popular sovereignty in a representative government meant speaking of ‘the 
rule of the public opinion by way of the ablest men, elected to such office by the people’. 
Representation in fact, was nothing but ‘a natural procedure to extract from the womb of society the 
“raison public” which, single-handedly, had the right to govern’. The existence of a ‘patriciate’ not 
based on privilege but supported ‘by its own strength would not be against democracy but rather it 
would be its educator’. These were the reasons for which ‘election by the people or the Pope’s 
consent would not be enough to create a legitimate power’. Power had to be held and administered 
‘in everyone’s  interest’30. 
On the extreme  right of the political spectrum, firm and unchanged reactionary criticism persisted. 
In 1853, Solaro della Margarita could not imagine a future for the monarchy without the nobility, 
which could be preserved only by birthright. The bourgeoisie was in fact constitutionally incapable 
of maintaining power and order. Solaro, as Louis De Bonald had already perceived in 1818, 
condemned the actions of the Italian moderates, beginning with the Congress of Vienna onwards, 
accusing them of preventing the restoration of ‘sound doctrines’; also, by ‘grafting ancient maxims 
(…) upon failing ones, they were producing a situation which, in a short time would put Europe in 
the same condition that France had been in before 1789, i.e. ready for new wars’31. Father Luigi 
Taparelli d’Azeglio also thought that there could not be any compromise with  revolutionary ideas. 
Even a representative government within a legitimate monarchy would eventually capitulate to the 
republic. Obviously, the reactionaries’ critique continued even after the order established by 
Vienna. According to Taparelli,  ‘legitimacy’ could not be replaced by ‘the rule of law’. Taparelli  
curtly stated  that ‘opinion’ was the ‘tyrannical mother of illegitimate legality’32. 
Balbo’s biography had embodied the very attempt of the moderates, so stigmatized by Solaro, to 
allow the new democratic legitimacy to grow in the shadow of divine legitimization. Certainly, in 
the course of more than thirty years, he had developed the most profound and original reflections on 
the issue. In his last work concerning the representative monarchy, left unfinished due to his death 
in 1853, Balbo, like Burke, had discovered that the original sin of democratic thought was precisely 
in the way in which the French Revolution had taken place, the cause of sixty years of instability in 
the history of France during which a number of ‘subversive usurpations’ had occurred in 
succession. The main fault had to be ascribed to Louis XVI for granting the assembly, ‘the royal 
power to change the State’, creating the constitution and starting a revolution. ‘This mistake brought 
about many others, such as errors, crimes and destruction, the wickedness that everyone knows 
about’. For this reason, Balbo feared the demands of the Italian democrats for any kind of 
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constitutional assembly, be it legitimate or not.  Throughout Europe, monarchies had been 
established for fourteen centuries and ‘the feeling of loyalty’ towards them had not ‘diminished 
much’; it could not be stated that ‘the principle of legitimacy no longer had any strength’. As much 
as Balbo had praised the example of the American representative republic as free from some of the 
dangers existing in Europe, he thought that that system of government was still too young; in 
seventy-five years the American continent would probably be so crowded  that it would be difficult 
to warrant equality and, consequently, the very existence of a republic. By praising the English 
representative monarchy, Balbo had successfully described the interaction between the two 
principles of legitimacy and the mistakes which the radicalization of one of the two would cause. 
He thought that the theory of popular sovereignty, the kind that was established during the 
revolution, had been the source of disaster as it had increased ‘occasions and pretexts to start 
revolutions’. In fact, once that theory had been expressed, ‘it naturally developed on its own in 
everything occurring at the end of that century, which the world knows, deplores and for which it is 
still paying’. If Balbo thought that the purpose of any authority had to be the welfare of the people, 
the latter could not be considered ‘the origin of supreme authority or sovereignty’, which, instead  
derived from God, as an evident truth. It was necessary to recognize that the principle of divine 
legitimacy was true ‘as far as its origin was concerned’ and this recognition ‘would lead to the true 
solution of the great problem of political change, which would not be good or legitimate unless 
originating from the consensus and cooperation of the existing authorities. Thus, changes would be 
easier and revolutions more difficult’33. 
Several years ago, Rosario Romeo, Cavour’s most influential expert, wrote that his idea of ‘using 
liberal forces along with dynastic initiative’ was drawn more from ‘Peel’s liberal method rather than 
from De Maistre’s old diplomatic designs’34. In fact, when Peel died, Cavour wrote two articles in 
his memory. For him, this Englishman had simply represented ‘the ideal statesman of the moderate 
party’ since he had shown ‘most splendidly how the  political  and economic system of a people 
could be reconstructed without driving it into the abyss of revolution’35. In another article, Cavour 
explained that, in Italy, the term ‘moderate’ was synonymous with ‘liberal’ and the party possessing 
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this title would resume its struggle against ‘socialist radicalism’ as well as against the ‘absolutism 
of the divine right’36. In this political strategy, the agreement, called ‘connubio’ (the alliance), made 
by Cavour with the ‘center-left’ leader Urbano Rattazzi was rather important. The latter so 
described it: ‘The principles that were to inspire the new party were essentially two: the first was 
internal resistance to any arising reactionary trend’ as caused also ‘by the recent coup d’état that 
occurred in France; the second one, as much as the circumstances would allow it, was to foster the  
steady and progressive fulfillment of the liberties provided by our charter, which concerned the 
political, economic and administrative orders’37.  On the contrary, in view of the unitary program in 
the dynastic sense and to dispel any republican revolutionary temptation, the support that Cavour’s 
government had received from the ‘national society’ would be just as significant, in addition to and  
with the support of figures such as Daniel Manin, the advocate of the republic of Venice in 1848 – 
1849 and Giorgio Pallavicino, not by chance both disappointed republicans. In September of 1855, 
Manin wrote  in the ‘Le Siècle’: ‘If a regenerated Italy must have a king, it cannot be but one and 
none other than the king of Piedmont’. A few months earlier, from another newspaper, Pallavicino 
had retorted with realism against the attack waged by the republicans against the diplomatic 
initiatives of Piedmont, stating: ‘Italy is here in Turin; but, as you know, in Turin the Italian flag 
flies on the towers of a royal palace’. In view of the imminent War of Independence, the help of 
both the King of Sardinia and his army were essential. Pallavicino had been clear about his fears of 
an impending  revolution: ‘Now, the democratic volcano is not blazing, but a fire, a terrible fire is 
smoldering in the bowels of the earth: eruption can take place at any moment now. It would be 
prudent to be prepared’38. In 1860, Cavour therefore reaffirmed that ‘the king’s government is the 
only conservative power in Italy that is able to erect a barrier against the true revolutionary spirit 
and tame it. (…) We are the representatives of the monarchic principle which in Italy has 
disappeared from the hearts before being demolished by popular revenge. We have lifted it again 
and we have instilled new life into it and we have newly consecrated it. (…) And until the Kingdom 
of Italy is built on the indestructible foundations of the national and monarchic rule of law’, Europe 
must put aside the severe judgment which still weighs upon us39. It therefore was not by chance 
that, once more, Cavour was looking for a wise blend between two principles of legitimacy, now 
that other Italian legitimate princes had already lost or were on the verge of losing their power and 
dominions. Obviously, the managers of the State of Savoy and moderate writers were not 
indifferent to the problem, as Roberto Romani has well clarified40. Carlo Bon-Compagni, Savoy’s 
special Commissioner in Tuscany, did not deny that it would be ‘desirable to maintain the authority 
of the legitimate monarchy, (…) but the interests of one family were not to prevail over those 
hundreds of thousands or millions of men upon which it is not possible to impose a government to 
which they have not consented’. The dynasties which had been dispossessed, opposed the people’s 
rights and since they firmly hoped for the conservation of the existing order and feared the republic, 
they held ‘the hereditary monarchy in great esteem as it maintained the habits of universal and 
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spontaneous obedience among the people of modern Europe’. Hence, they had to accept the 
monarch from Piedmont, demanded by the people of central Italy ‘as their king by unanimous vote’. 
Reinstating the previous princes, ‘unanimously deprived of their power by their subjects’ would not 
prevent other and more dangerous ‘revolutionary upheavals’. Bon-Compagni knew very well that 
‘bitter end advocates of legitimacy rights would not give up’, but the people were not ‘to submit to 
their sovereign in the same way in which all men are destined to obey God’. In fact, the sovereign 
was to be obeyed inasmuch as he respected everyone’s rights and ‘the most valuable and sacred 
right of all nations was independence. Its loss, compared to other political ills, was like death 
compared to bodily disease’. Moreover, Bon-Compagni was eager to specify that the Italians had 
demanded ‘the peoples’ suffrage when it was necessary for them to have a government that would 
obtain spontaneous and universal obedience; they never used it to upset the states41. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We have seen how the political strategy of Italian moderates of any persuasion was to reach the 
country’s unification, avoiding any risk of revolutionary uprising. They attempted first to involve  
the sovereigns of the different States, through the concession of the representative government; they 
then supported Piedmont, which indeed had preserved a representative government, to continue the 
struggle for independence. Moreover, they understood that only monarchical legitimacy, which was 
deeply rooted in the country, could conclude such an operation successfully. 
The issue of legitimacy of power would also be linked to the first phases of Italy’s unification, 
affecting the soul of the most sensitive Italian writers, such as Alessandro Manzoni who, in 1873, 
approached the issue in a posthumous and incomplete work, in which he precisely recalled Balbo’s 
theories. In a country which, on the one hand, witnessed the corrosion of legitimacy caused by a 
devastating civil war called ‘brigandage’ and, on the other, underwent the incessant action of the 
more radical democrats, Manzoni wrote some reflections comparing the 1789 French revolution to 
the Italian revolution of 1859. For Lucy Riall, this  was a ‘devastating blow to legitimacy in liberal 
Italy’ if one bears in mind that Manzoni was Catholic and that the annexation of the Papal States in 
1870 resulted in papal excommunication42.  Nonetheless, Manzoni had tried to show that the Italian 
revolution, if compared with the French one, had been more legitimate, since it had sprung from 
‘the mutual trust and respect for king and country’. Instead, the French Revolution had broken out 
eighty years before and had aimed at replacing ‘the kingdom of abuse with the kingdom of the rule 
of law’ and was actually  ‘far from over’. Essentially, Manzoni identified the cause of the main 
difficulties which the French had experienced in forming a stable government. He thought they 
resided in the establishment of  a new principle of legitimacy after abandoning the old order. He had 
in fact asked himself: ‘What more conclusive proof can there be of the difficulty in establishing a 
government than having produced ten constitutions in little more than sixty years?’. In the Third 
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Estate, which had appointed itself as the ‘Assembly’, Manzoni had seen the key to all the 
subsequent developments, such as the establishment of popular sovereignty inherited from the 
Enlightenment, which had been the very engine of the revolution, and above all, the destruction of 
the existing government, which the Assembly had never been able to carry out and never thought of 
replacing43. 
Manzoni’s position reflected Burke’s interpretation of the French events, which would greatly 
influence the political thought of the Italian moderates during most part of the 19th century. Beyond 
the historiographical debate on Italian moderatism, these authors, though so diverse, regarded the 
issue of the legitimacy of power after the 40s as crucial, both in the perspective of the introduction 
of liberal reforms and in consideration of the journey towards independence. Despite the restoration 
of past governments, they were able get a glimpse of how popular legitimacy, after the French 
revolution, seemed destined by history to also conquer the states of the Old Continent. They also  
understood, at different times and in different circumstances, that such a conquest would occur 
painlessly only if allowed to develop gradually within the monarchic structure and under its 
legitimacy. On the other hand, that was the framework in which the majority of the Italian 
population recognized itself. 
 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	   A. Manzoni, La rivoluzione francese del 1789 e la rivoluzione italiana del 1859. Dell’indipendenza dell’Italia 
(1873), Milano, Centro Nazionale Studi Manzoniani, 2000, pp. 26, 53, 95, 280, 289. 
	  
